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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-4423 
___________ 
 
TYREE LAWSON, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RYAN McNAMARA; THOMAS KEY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00382) 
District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 14, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tyree Lawson, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
or in the alternative, for summary judgment in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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 The record reflects that on April 17, 2008, Lawson was sitting in his car, which 
was parked on a street in Philadelphia.  Thomas Kee and Dennis Watson, Special Deputy 
United States Marshals assigned to the Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force, approached 
Lawson’s car in order to serve a warrant for his arrest for attempted murder and other 
state offenses.  Kee ordered Lawson to put his hands up and Lawson complied.  Kee was 
unable to open the car door because the handle was broken.  Special Deputy United 
States Marshal Ryan McNamara and Deputy United States Marshal Steve Mason arrived 
at the scene and parked behind Lawson.  McNamara and Mason got out of their car and 
stood behind Lawson’s car. 
 According to Lawson, Kee forcibly gripped his neck and tried to pull him out of 
the car window.  Lawson states that he tried to tell Kee he was choking him, but Kee told 
him to shut up.  Lawson further states that he was able to break free, that Kee then yelled 
“shoot,” and that McNamara shot at him through the windshield, just missing his head.  
Lawson then drove in reverse, hit the police car behind him, and then drove forward, 
fleeing the scene.  Kee, however, attested that Lawson began struggling with him as he 
reached into the car to try to put it in park and to open the door from the inside.  Kee 
stated that he tried to pull Lawson through the car window but denied that his hands were 
on Lawson’s neck or that he yelled “shoot.”  Kee and McNamara also attested that 
McNamara fired the shot after Lawson had hit the police car and was pulling away. 
 Lawson was later apprehended and pleaded guilty in District Court to three counts 
of assault on a federal officer with a dangerous weapon (his car), in violation of 18 
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U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) & (b).  He received a sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment.  During 
his plea colloquy, Lawson agreed with the factual basis for the plea presented by the 
Government.  The Government stated that Lawson forcibly struggled with Kee and 
Watson as the officers tried to put his car in park and place him under arrest, that during 
the struggle Lawson was revving his car by hitting the accelerator, and that McNamara 
fired his gun after Lawson struck the car behind him and began to drive away. 
 Lawson filed a complaint against McNamara and Kee, claiming that they used 
excessive force during the attempted arrest.  Lawson averred that as a result of his 
encounter with McNamara and Kee, he now suffers from depression, fear, and a sleeping 
disorder.  Lawson also alleged in his complaint that the charges brought against him for 
assaulting a federal officer were made to cover up the misconduct of McNamara and Kee 
and that his guilty plea was a result of ineffective legal representation. 
 The District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, or in 
the alternative, for summary judgment.
1
  The District Court agreed with the defendants 
that, to the extent Lawson challenged his conviction for assaulting a federal officer or the 
state convictions for which he was arrested, dismissal was warranted under Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  The District Court further ruled that Lawson’s 
                                                 
1
 Although Lawson brought his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
District Court properly construed the action as brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which 
recognized a private cause of action to recover damages against federal actors for 
constitutional violations. 
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excessive force claims were not barred by Heck, but that the defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity because the facts did not show a violation of Lawson’s constitutional 
rights.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review of the 
District Court’s order of dismissal and grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Atkinson 
v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 The District Court properly dismissed any claims based on Lawson’s allegations 
in his complaint that his federal conviction is fraudulent and that he pleaded guilty only 
because his attorney failed to adequately represent him.  Such claims challenge the 
validity of Lawson’s federal conviction and are barred by Heck, which mandates 
dismissal where a judgment in favor of a prisoner in a § 1983 action would necessarily 
imply the invalidity of his conviction, unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction 
has been invalidated.  512 U.S. at 487.  See also Lora-Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 506 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting Heck has been applied to Bivens claims).  Lawson 
does not contend his conviction has been invalidated.  Similarly, to the extent Lawson 
claims his state convictions for attempted murder and other offenses are fraudulent, such 
claims also are not cognizable. 
 We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Kee and McNamara are 
entitled to qualified immunity because the facts do not establish a violation of  Lawson’s 
constitutional rights.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-18 
(2009) (setting forth test for qualified immunity).  As explained by the District Court, 
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excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).  The Fourth Amendment 
applies when there has been a seizure, which occurs only when government actors have 
in some way restrained a person’s liberty by use of physical force or show of authority.  
Id. at 395 n.10.  A seizure does not occur where there has been a show of authority and 
the subject does not yield to police.  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
Applying these principles, McNamara did not violate Lawson’s Fourth 
Amendment rights because there was no seizure.  McNamara shot at Lawson and missed 
and Lawson fled the scene.  Because Lawson did not yield to McNamara’s show of 
authority, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.  See Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 
336 F.3d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding Fourth Amendment not implicated where 
officer fired his gun at a car in an attempt to stop it). 
 Kee, however, admits he placed his hands on Lawson in an effort to arrest him.  
This amounted to a seizure.  See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.   Because there was a 
seizure, the District Court properly considered whether Kee’s actions were objectively 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.  The 
District Court recognized that the parties dispute whether Kee choked Lawson but 
concluded that, even assuming Kee choked Lawson, the facts do not show a 
constitutional violation.  We agree.  Lawson was not physically injured in the 
confrontation with Kee and the force was used when Kee was attempting to arrest 
Lawson.  Kee grabbed Lawson after he was unable to open Lawson’s car door.  Lawson 
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struggled with Kee and Kee believed that Lawson was armed and dangerous.  Based on 
the totality of the circumstances, the facts do not show a constitutional violation and Kee 
is entitled to qualified immunity.
2
 
 Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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2
 The District Court did not credit Lawson’s affidavit to the extent he denied that 
he resisted arrest because the affidavit is inconsistent with the factual basis for his plea.  
At his plea hearing, Lawson agreed with the Government’s statement that he had forcibly 
struggled as Kee tried to place him under arrest.  Because Lawson did not explain the 
inconsistency, the District Court did not err in concluding that Lawson had resisted arrest.  
See Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating party may not create a 
material issue of fact by filing an affidavit disputing his own sworn testimony without 
explaining the conflict). 
3
 Lawson’s motion for transcripts is denied as this appeal does not raise a 
substantial question.  28 U.S.C. § 753(f).  Lawson’s motion to stop interference with his 
mail is also denied. 
